Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-1247-2025-MA-01

Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casing Version 2.6.1, Firmware Version 2.0.4-612, TOE Casing Version 0

from

Bundesdruckerei GmbH

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the developer's Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-1247-2025.

The certified product (TOE Software & Casing) itself did not change. The changes are related to the Rest of the Terminal Firmware (including the Operating System) and an update of the user guidance.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1247-2025 dated 30 January 2025 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1247-2025.

Bonn, 7 March 2025

The Federal Office for Information Security

Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casing Version 2.6.1, Firmware Version 2.0.4-612, TOE Casing Version 0, Bundesdruckerei GmbH, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casingVersion 2.6.1, Firmware Version 2.0.4-612, TOE Casing Version 0 was changed due to changes in the Rest of the Terminal Firmware (including the Operating System) outside of the TOE. Configuration Management procedures required a change in the product identifier. Therefore the version number changed from "*Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casing Version 2.6.1; Firmware Version. 1.6.24-604, TOE Casing Version 0*" to "*Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casing Version 2.6.1, Firmware Version 2.0.4-612, TOE Casing Version 0*". The certified product itself did not change. The changes also cover an related update of the user guidance [6]. The Guidance Version 1.233 has the following hash value (SHA256): fddb045c86d86a0d05036b2d44143e9f6088f0e9e100d3b5636867f48899d87f

Conclusion

The maintained change is at the level of implementation outside the TOE and related guidance documentation. The change has no effect on product assurance.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has <u>not</u> been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1247-2025 dated 30 January 2025 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

Obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG[1] Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

For details on results of the evaluation of cryptographic aspects refer to the Certification Report [3] chapter 9.2.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

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1   Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

References

[1]　Common Criteria document "Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements", version 3.1, 29 February 2024

　　　Common Criteria document "Assurance Continuity: SOG-IS Requirements", version 1.2, March 2024

[2]　IAR – Impact Analysis Report, Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casing, Document Application, Version: 1.0, 2025-01-17, Bundesdruckerei GmbH (confidential document)

[3]　Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1247-2025 for Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casing Version 2.6.1; Firmware Version 1.6.24-604, TOE Casing Version 0 from Bundesdruckerei GmbH, Version 1.0, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 2025-01-30

[4]　Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1247-2025, Version 1.66, 2024-09-25, Security Target Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casing, Bundesdruckerei GmbH

[5]　Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.48, 2025-02-11, ALC_CMS_DMT-V1.48.xlsx, Bundesdruckerei GmbH (confidential document)

[6]　Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.233, 2025-01-16, VISOTEC® V-ÄNDERUNGSTERMINAL Handbuch Installation und Bedienung, Bundesdruckerei GmbH