
CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 Security Target

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1. Security Target Introduction

This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST conventions, ST conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is the Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 provided by CommScope Technologies LLC. The TOE is being evaluated as a network device.

The Security Target contains the following additional sections:

- Conformance Claims (Section 2)
- Security Objectives (Section 3)
- Extended Components Definition (Section 4)
- Security Requirements (Section 5)
- TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)

Conventions

The following conventions have been applied in this document:

- Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
 - Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST, iteration is indicated by a parenthetical number placed at the end of the component. For example FDP_ACC.1(1) and FDP_ACC.1(2) indicate that the ST includes two iterations of the FDP_ACC.1 requirement.
 - Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [**assignment**]). Note that an assignment within a selection would be identified in italics and with embedded bold brackets (e.g., [***selected-assignment***]).
 - Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [***selection***]).
 - Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions, and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “... **all** objects ...” or “... ~~some~~ **big** things ...”).
- Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as captions.

1.1 Security Target Reference

ST Title – CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 Security Target

ST Version – Version 0.5

ST Date – June 28, 2024

1.2 TOE Reference

TOE Identification – CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10, including the following series and models:

- ICX-7150 (Broadcom NICs)
 - ICX7150-24-4X10GR-A
 - ICX7150-C12P-2X10GR-A
 - ICX7150-24P-4X10GR-A
 - ICX7150-48-4X10GR-A
 - ICX7150-48P-4X10GR-A
 - ICX7150-48PF-4X10GR-A
 - ICX7150-48ZP-8X10GR2-A
- ICX7550 Series (Broadcom NICs)
 - ICX7550-48ZP

- ICX7550-48P
 - ICX7550-48F
- ICX7650 Series (Broadcom NICs)
 - ICX7650-48ZP
 - ICX7650-48P
 - ICX7650-48F
- ICX7850 Series (Broadcom NICs)
 - ICX7850-48FS
- ICX8200 (Marvell NICs)
 - ICX8200-24,
 - ICX8200-24P,
 - ICX8200-48,
 - ICX8200-48P,
 - ICX8200-48PF,
 - ICX8200-48PF2,
 - ICX8200-CO8PF,
 - ICX8200-24ZP,
 - ICX8200-48ZP2,
 - ICX8200-CO8ZP,
 - ICX8200-24F,
 - ICX8200-48F,
 - ICX8200-24FX

TOE Developer – CommScope Technologies LLC

Evaluation Sponsor – CommScope Technologies LLC

1.3 TOE Overview

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 family of products. The TOE is composed of a hardware appliance with embedded software installed on a management processor. The software controls the switching and routing network frames and packets among the connections available on the hardware appliances.

All TOE appliances are configured at the factory with default parameters to allow immediate use of the system's basic features through its Command Line Interface (CLI). However, the product should be configured in accordance with the evaluated configuration (using the Ruckus FastIron FIPS and Common Criteria Configuration Guide) prior to being placed into operation. The CLI is a text based interface which is accessible from a directly connected terminal or via a remote terminal using SSH. This remote management interface is protected using encryption as explained later in this ST.

The hardware platforms that support the TOE have a number of common hardware characteristics:

- Central processor that supports all system operations
- Dynamic memory, used by the central processor for all system operations
- Flash memory, used to store the operating system image
- Non-volatile memory, which stores configuration parameters used to initialize the system at system startup
- Multiple physical network interfaces either fixed in configuration or removable as in a chassis based product

1.4 TOE Description

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10d including the following series and models:

- ICX-7150 (Broadcom NICs)

- ICX7150-24-4X10GR-A
 - ICX7150-C12P-2X10GR-A
 - ICX7150-24P-4X10GR-A
 - ICX7150-48-4X10GR-A
 - ICX7150-48P-4X10GR-A
 - ICX7150-48PF-4X10GR-A
 - ICX7150-48ZP-8X10GR2-A
- ICX7550 Series (Broadcom NICs)
 - ICX7550-48ZP
 - ICX7550-48P
 - ICX7550-48F
- ICX7650 Series (Broadcom NICs)
 - ICX7650-48ZP
 - ICX7650-48P
 - ICX7650-48F
- ICX7850 Series (Broadcom NICs)
 - ICX7850-48FS
- ICX8200 (Marvell NICs)
 - ICX8200-24,
 - ICX8200-24P,
 - ICX8200-48,
 - ICX8200-48P,
 - ICX8200-48PF,
 - ICX8200-48PF2,
 - ICX8200-CO8PF,
 - ICX8200-24ZP,
 - ICX8200-48ZP2,
 - ICX8200-CO8ZP,
 - ICX8200-24F,
 - ICX8200-48F,
 - ICX8200-24FX

While there are different models, they differ primarily in physical form factor, number and types of connections and slots, and relative performance. The ICX Series possesses between 12 and 48 10/100/1000 Mbps RJ-45 ports, and the presence of “F” in the model number indicates 100/1000 Mbps SFP ports instead of RJ-45 ports and the presence of “P” indicates that the RJ-45 ports are PoE+. While there are some functional differences among the families, they each provide the same security characteristics as claimed in this security target.

The different series have differing CPUs as described below:

- The ICX 7150 Series utilizes a Dual-core ARM Cortex A9 1GHz (ARMv7 architecture)
- The ICX 7550 Series utilizes a Quad-core ARM Cortex A72 (ARMv8 architecture)
- The ICX 7650 Series utilizes a Quad-core ARM Cortex A57 1.6GHz (ARMv8 architecture)
- The ICX 7850 Series utilizes a Quad-core ARM Cortex A57 1.6GHz (ARMv8 architecture)
- The ICX 8200 Series utilizes a Quad-core ARM Cortex A55 1500 MHz (ARMv8 architecture)

The TOE utilizes the Firmware crypto library referred to as the RUCKUS-IP-CRYPTO-VER-6.0 running on this processor.

1.4.1 TOE Architecture

The basic architecture of each TOE appliance begins with a hardware appliance with physical network connections. Within the hardware appliance, the IOS is designed to control and enable access to the available hardware functions

(e.g., program execution, device access, facilitate basic routing and switching functions). IOS enforces applicable security policies on network information flowing through the hardware appliance.

During normal operation, IP packets are sent to the management IP address or through the appliance over one or more of its physical network interfaces, which processes them according to the system's configuration and state information dynamically maintained by the appliance. This processing typically results in the frames or packets being forwarded out of the device over another interface.

1.4.1.1 Physical Boundaries

Each TOE appliance has physical network connections to its environment to facilitate routing and switching of network traffic. The TOE appliance can also be the destination of network traffic, where it provides interfaces for its own management.

The TOE may be accessed and managed through a PC or terminal in an environment which can be remote from or directly connected to the TOE.

The TOE can be configured to forward its audit records to an external syslog server in the network environment. This is generally advisable given the limited audit log storage space on the evaluated appliances.

The use of a RADIUS authentication server is included in the evaluated configuration with communication occurring over a protected channel.

The TOE can be configured to use an NTP server for network time or it can use its own hardware clock.

Figure 1 shows the TOE in its operating environment.




Figure 1 TOE Operational Environment

1.4.1.2 Logical Boundaries

This section summarizes the security functions provided by Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10:

- Security audit
- Cryptographic support
- Identification and authentication
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE access
- Trusted path/channels

Security audit

The TOE is able to generate logs for a wide range of security relevant events. The TOE can be configured to store the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator and also to send the logs to a designated log server using TLS to protect the logs while in transit on the network.

Cryptographic support

The TOE contains a CAVP-tested cryptographic module that provides key management, random bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing features in support of higher-level cryptographic protocols including SSH and TLS. The TOE supports SHA1 message digest authentication for NTP servers.

Identification and authentication

The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions mediated by the TOE, with the exception of passing network traffic in accordance with its configured switching/routing rules. It provides the ability to both assign attributes (user names, passwords and privilege levels) and to authenticate users against these attributes.

Security management

The TOE provides Command Line Interface (CLI) commands to access the wide range of security management functions to manage its security policies. All administrative activity and functions including security management commands are limited to authorized users (i.e., administrators) only after they have provided acceptable user identification and authentication data to the TOE. The security management functions are controlled through the use of privileges associated with roles that can be assigned to TOE users. Among the available privileges, only the Super User can actually manage the security policies provided by the TOE and the TOE offers a complete set of functions to facilitate effective management since the Super User allows for complete read-and-write access to the system.

Protection of the TSF

The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features.

It protects particularly sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability). The TOE can also be configured to work with an NTP server for reliable time.

The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.

TOE access

The TOE can be configured to display a message of the day banner when an administrator establishes an interactive session and subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity timeout value after which the inactive session (local or remote) will be terminated.

Trusted path/channels

The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSH for CLI access to ensure both integrity and disclosure protection. If the negotiation of an encrypted session fails or if the user does not have authorization for remote administration, an attempted connection will not be established.

The TOE protects communication with network peers, such as a log server, using TLS connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification of logs.

1.4.2 TOE Documentation

CommScope Technologies LLC offers a series of documents that describe the installation of the FastIron switch/router products as well as guidance for subsequent use and administration of the applicable security features. The following document was examined as part of the evaluation:

- RUCKUS FastIron FIPS and Common Criteria Configuration Guide, 10.0.10, Supporting FastIron Software Release 10.0.10d

2. Conformance Claims

This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
 - Part 2 Extended
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
 - Part 3 Conformant
- Protection Profile Claims:
 - collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP), Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 (NDcPP22e)

Package	Technical Decision	Applied	Notes
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0800 - Updated NIT Technical Decision for IPsec IKE/SA Lifetimes Tolerance	No	Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0792 - NIT Technical Decision: FIA_PMG_EXT.1 - TSS EA not in line with SFR	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0790 - NIT Technical Decision: Clarification Required for testing IPv6	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0738 - NIT Technical Decision for Link to Allowed-With List	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0670 - NIT Technical Decision for Mutual and Non-Mutual Auth TLSC Testing	No	Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0639 - NIT Technical Decision for Clarification for NTP MAC Keys	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0638 - NIT Technical Decision for Key Pair Generation for Authentication	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0636 - NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of Public Key User Authentication for SSH	No	Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0635 - NIT Technical Decision for TLS Server and Key Agreement Parameters	No	Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0632 - NIT Technical Decision for Consistency with Time Data for vNDs	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0631 - NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of public key authentication for SSH Server	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0592 - NIT Technical Decision for Local Storage of Audit Records	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0591 - NIT Technical Decision for Virtual TOEs and hypervisors	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0581 - NIT Technical Decision for Elliptic curve-based key establishment and NIST SP 800-56Arev3	Yes	

CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0580 - NIT Technical Decision for clarification about use of DH14 in NDcPPv2.2e	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0572 - NiT Technical Decision for Restricting FTP_ITC.1 to only IP address identifiers	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0571 - NiT Technical Decision for Guidance on how to handle FIA_AFL.1	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0570 - NiT Technical Decision for Clarification about FIA_AFL.1	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0569 - NIT Technical Decision for Session ID Usage Conflict in FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.7	No	Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0564 - NiT Technical Decision for Vulnerability Analysis Search Criteria	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0563 - NiT Technical Decision for Clarification of audit date information	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0556 - NIT Technical Decision for RFC 5077 question	No	Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0555 – NIT Technical Decision for RFC Reference incorrect in TLSS Test	No	Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0547 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarification on developer disclosure of AVA_VAN	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0546 – NIT Technical Decision for DTLS – clarification of Application Note 63	No	Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0537 – NIT Technical Decision for Incorrect reference to FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0536 – NIT Technical Decision for Update Verification Inconsistency	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0528 – NIT Technical Decision for Missing Eas for FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0527 – Updates to Certificate Revocation Testing (FIA_X509_EXT.1)	Yes	

Table 1 Technical Decisions

2.1 Conformance Rationale

The ST conforms to the NDcPP22e. As explained previously, the security problem definition, security objectives, and security requirements have been drawn from the PP.

3. Security Objectives

The Security Problem Definition may be found in the NDcPP22e and this section reproduces only the corresponding Security Objectives for operational environment for reader convenience. The NDcPP22e offers additional information about the identified security objectives, but that has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP22e should be consulted if there is interest in that material.

In general, the NDcPP22e has defined Security Objectives appropriate for the Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 TOE.

3.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

OE.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the TOE must be protected on any other platform on which they reside.

OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the operation, administration and support of the TOE. Note: For vNDs the TOE includes only the contents of its own VM, and does not include other VMs or the VS.

OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that traverses it. It is assumed that protection of this traffic will be covered by other security and assurance measures in the operational environment.

OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is provided by the environment.

OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Security Administrator ensures that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment. For vNDs, this applies when the physical platform on which the VM runs is removed from its operational environment.

OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all guidance documentation in a trusted manner. For vNDs, this includes the VS Administrator responsible for configuring the VMs that implement ND functionality.

For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are assumed to monitor the revocation status of all certificates in the TOE's trust store and to remove any certificate from the TOE's trust store in case such certificate can no longer be trusted.

OE.UPDATES The TOE firmware and software is updated by an administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.

4. Extended Components Definition

All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the NDcPP22e. The NDcPP22e defines the following extended requirements and since they are not redefined in this ST the NDcPP22e should be consulted for more information in regard to those CC extensions.

Extended SFRs:

- NDcPP22e:FAU_STG_EXT.1: Protected Audit Event Storage
- NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1: NTP Protocol
- NDcPP22e:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation
- NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1: SSH Server Protocol
- NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual Authentication
- NDcPP22e:FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Password Management
- NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Password-based Authentication Mechanism
- NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication
- NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev: X.509 Certificate Validation
- NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.2: X.509 Certificate Authentication
- NDcPP22e:FPT_APW_EXT.1: Protection of Administrator Passwords
- NDcPP22e:FPT_SKP_EXT.1: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)
- NDcPP22e:FPT_STM_EXT.1: Reliable Time Stamps
- NDcPP22e:FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF testing
- NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted update
- NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking

5. Security Requirements

This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation effort.

The SFRs have all been drawn from the NDcPP22e. The refinements and operations already performed in the NDcPP22e are not identified (e.g., highlighted) here, rather the requirements have been copied from the NDcPP22e and any residual operations have been completed herein. Of particular note, the NDcPP22e made a number of refinements and completed some of the SFR operations defined in the Common Criteria (CC) and that PP should be consulted to identify those changes if necessary.

The SARs are the set of SARs specified in NDcPP22e.

5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 TOE

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
FAU: Security audit	NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.1: Audit Data Generation
	NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.2: User identity association
	NDcPP22e:FAU_STG_EXT.1: Protected Audit Event Storage
FCS: Cryptographic support	NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic Key Generation
	NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.2: Cryptographic Key Establishment
	NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.4: Cryptographic Key Destruction
	NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption: Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
	NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/Hash: Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
	NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash: Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
	NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/SigGen: Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
	NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1: NTP Protocol
	NDcPP22e:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation
	NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1: SSH Server Protocol
	NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual Authentication
	NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.2: TLS Server Protocol Without Mutual Authentication
FIA: Identification and authentication	NDcPP22e:FIA_AFL.1: Authentication Failure Management
	NDcPP22e:FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Password Management
	NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU.7: Protected Authentication Feedback
	NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Password-based Authentication Mechanism
	NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication
	NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev: X.509 Certificate Validation
	NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.2: X.509 Certificate Authentication
	NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.3: X.509 Certificate Revocation
FMT: Security management	NDcPP22e:FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate: Management of security functions behaviour
	NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CoreData: Management of TSF Data
	NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys: Management of TSF Data
	NDcPP22e:FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
	NDcPP22e:FMT_SMR.2: Restrictions on Security Roles

FPT: Protection of the TSF	NDcPP22e:FPT_APW_EXT.1: Protection of Administrator Passwords
	NDcPP22e:FPT_SKP_EXT.1: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)
	NDcPP22e:FPT_STM_EXT.1: Reliable Time Stamps
	NDcPP22e:FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF testing
	NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted update
FTA: TOE access	NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.3: TSF-initiated Termination
	NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.4: User-initiated Termination
	NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking
	NDcPP22e:FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE Access Banners
FTP: Trusted path/channels	NDcPP22e:FTP_ITC.1: Inter-TSF trusted channel
	NDcPP22e:FTP_TRP.1/Admin: Trusted Path

Table 2 TOE Security Functional Components

5.1.1 Security audit (FAU)

5.1.1.1 Audit Data Generation (NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.1)

NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.1.1

The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
- All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
- All administrative actions comprising:
 - Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user accounts are required for administrators).
 - Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).
 - Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged).
 - Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).
 - [no other actions]**;
- Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 3.

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Content
NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.1	None	None
NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.2	None	None
NDcPP22e:FAU_STG_EXT.1	None	None
NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.1	None	None
NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.2	None	None
NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.4	None	None
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	None	None
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/Hash	None	None
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	None	None
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/SigGen	None	None
NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1	Configuration of a new time server Removal of configured time server	Identity if new/removed time server
NDcPP22e:FCS_RBG_EXT.1	None	None
NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	Failure to establish an SSH session.	Reason for failure.

NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1	Failure to establish a TLS Session.	Reason for failure.
NDcPP22e:FIA_AFL.1	Unsuccessful login attempt limit is met or exceeded.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
NDcPP22e:FIA_PMG_EXT.1	None	None
NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU.7	None	None
NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU_EXT.2	All use of identification and authentication mechanism.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1	All use of identification and authentication mechanism.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	Unsuccessful attempt to validate a certificate. Any addition, replacement or removal of trust anchors in the TOE's trust store	Reason for failure of certificate validation Identification of certificates added, replaced or removed as trust anchor in the TOE's trust store
NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.2	None	None
NDcPP22e:FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate	Any attempt to initiate a manual update.	None
NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CoreData	None	None
NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys	None	None
NDcPP22e:FMT_SMF.1	All management activities of TSF data.	None
NDcPP22e:FMT_SMR.2	None	None
NDcPP22e:FPT_APW_EXT.1	None	None
NDcPP22e:FPT_SKP_EXT.1	None	None
NDcPP22e:FPT_STM_EXT.1	Discontinuous changes to time – either Administrator actuated or changed via an automated process. (Note that no continuous changes to time need to be logged. See also application note on FPT_STM_EXT.1)	For discontinuous changes to time: The old and new values for the time. Origin of the attempt to change time for success and failure (e.g., IP address).
NDcPP22e:FPT_TST_EXT.1	None	None
NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Initiation of update; result of the update attempt (success or failure).	None
NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.3	The termination of a remote session by the session locking mechanism.	None
NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.4	The termination of an interactive session.	None
NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL_EXT.1	The termination of a local session by the session locking mechanism.	None
NDcPP22e:FTA_TAB.1	None	None
NDcPP22e:FTP_ITC.1	Initiation of the trusted channel. Termination of the trusted channel. Failure of the trusted channel functions.	Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channels establishment attempt.
NDcPP22e:FTP_TRP.1/Admin	Initiation of the trusted path. Termination of the trusted	None

	path. Failure of the trusted path functions.	
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Table 3 Security Functional Requirements and Auditable Events**NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.1.2**

The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the cPP/ST, information specified in column three of Table 3.

5.1.1.2 User identity association (NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.2)**NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.2.1**

For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

5.1.1.3 Protected Audit Event Storage (NDcPP22e:FAU_STG_EXT.1)**NDcPP22e:FAU_STG_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1.

NDcPP22e:FAU_STG_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself. In addition
[*The TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally,*]

NDcPP22e:FAU_STG_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall [*overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule: [audit is stored in a circular buffer and oldest records are overwritten first]*] when the local storage space for audit data is full.

5.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)**5.1.2.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.1)****NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.1.1**

The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: [

- *RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Appendix B.3,*
- *ECC schemes using 'NIST curves' [P-256, P-384, P-521] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Appendix B.4,*
- *FFC Schemes using safe-prime groups that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography and [RFC 3526, RFC 7919].*

5.1.2.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.2)**NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.2.1**

The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method: [

- *RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447, Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,*

- *Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, 'Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography' (TD0581 applied),*
- *FFC Schemes using safe-prime groups that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography and [groups listed in RFC 3526, groups listed in 7919] (TD0580 applied)].*

5.1.2.3 Cryptographic Key Destruction (NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.4)

NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.4.1

The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method

- For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [*single overwrite consisting of [zeroes]*];
- For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by the invocation of an interface provided by a part of the TSF that [*logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [single] overwrite consisting of [zeroes]*]

that meets the following: No Standard.

5.1.2.4 Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption) (NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption)

NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption

The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in [*CBC, CTR, GCM*] mode and cryptographic key sizes [*128 bits, 256 bits*] that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, [*CBC as specified in ISO 10116, CTR as specified in ISO 10116, GCM as specified in ISO 19772*].

5.1.2.5 Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm) (NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/Hash)

NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1.1/Hash

The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512*] and message digest sizes [*160, 256, 384, 512*] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.

5.1.2.6 Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) (NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash)

NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash

The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512*] and cryptographic key sizes [*160, 256, 384, 512*] and message digest sizes [*160, 256, 384, 512*] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 'MAC Algorithm 2'.

5.1.2.7 Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification) (NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/SigGen)

NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen

The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [

- *RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus) [2048, 3072, 4096 bits]*
 - *Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes [256, 384, 521 bits]*
- that meet the following: [

- *For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3*

- For ECDSA schemes: *FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 6 and Appendix D, Implementing 'NIST curves' [P-256, P-384, P-521]; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4*].

5.1.2.8 NTP Protocol (NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1)

NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall use only the following NTP version(s) [*NTP v3 (RFC 1305), NTP v4 (RFC 5905)*].

NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall update its system time using [*Authentication using [SHA1] as the message digest algorithm(s)*].

NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall not update NTP timestamp from broadcast and/or multicast addresses.

NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall support configuration of at least three (3) NTP time sources in the Operational Environment.

5.1.2.9 Random Bit Generation (NDcPP22e:FCS_RBG_EXT.1)

NDcPP22e:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [*CTR_DRBG (AES)*].

NDcPP22e:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2

The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from [*one software-based noise source*] with a minimum of [*256 bits*] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 'Security Strength Table for Hash Functions', of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

5.1.2.10 SSH Server Protocol (NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1)

NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with: RFC(s) 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, [*4256*].

NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following user authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [*password-based*].

NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [*262130*] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.

NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [*aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc*].

NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5

The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses [*ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521*] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.

NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6

The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [*hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512*] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).

NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7

The TSF shall ensure that [*ecdh-sha2-nistp256*] and [*diffie-hellman-group14-sha256, diffie-hellman-group16-sha512, diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp521*] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.

NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8

The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey needs to be performed.
(TD0631 applied)

5.1.2.11 TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual Authentication (NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1)**NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall implement [*TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)*] and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:
[*TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268,*
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289]
and no other ciphersuites.

NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches [*the reference identifier per RFC 6125 section 6*].

NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3

When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also [*Not implement any administrator override mechanism*].

NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall [*present the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension with the following curves/groups: [ffdhe2048, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1] and no other curves/groups*] in the Client Hello.
(TD0670 applied)

5.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)**5.1.3.1 Authentication Failure Management (NDcPP22e:FIA_AFL.1)****NDcPP22e:FIA_AFL.1.1**

The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within [3-100] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to Administrators attempting to authenticate remotely using a password.

NDcPP22e:FIA_AFL.1.2

When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall [*prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing a remote session using any authentication method that involves a password until an Administrator defined time period has elapsed*].

5.1.3.2 Password Management (NDcPP22e:FIA_PMG_EXT.1)**NDcPP22e:FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative passwords:

- a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [*'!', '@', '#', '\$', '%', '^', '&', '(', ')*];

- b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to between [8] and [60] characters.

5.1.3.3 Protected Authentication Feedback (NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU.7)

NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU.7.1

The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while the authentication is in progress at the local console.

5.1.3.4 Password-based Authentication Mechanism (NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU_EXT.2)

NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall provide a local [*password-based*] authentication mechanism to perform local administrative user authentication.

5.1.3.5 User Identification and Authentication (NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1)

NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the identification and authentication process:

- Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
- [*network routing services*].

NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user.

5.1.3.6 X.509 Certificate Validation (NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev)

NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/Rev

The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certification path validation supporting a minimum path length of three certificates.
- The certification path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.
- The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
- The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [*the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 6960*]
- The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
 - o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
 - o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
 - o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
 - o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.

NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/Rev

The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

5.1.3.7 X.509 Certificate Authentication (NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.2)

NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [*TLS*], and [*no additional uses*].

NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.2.2

When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall [*not accept the certificate*].

5.1.4 Security management (FMT)**5.1.4.1 Management of security functions behaviour (NDcPP22e:FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate)****NDcPP22e:FMT_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate**

The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual updates to Security Administrators.

5.1.4.2 Management of TSF Data (NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CoreData)**NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1.1/CoreData**

The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security Administrators.

5.1.4.3 Management of TSF Data (NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys)**NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1.1/CryptoKeys**

The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the cryptographic keys to Security Administrators.

5.1.4.4 Specification of Management Functions (NDcPP22e:FMT_SMF.1)**NDcPP22e:FMT_SMF.1.1**

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
- Ability to configure the access banner;
- Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
- Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [*digital signature*] capability prior to installing those updates;
- Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;
- [Ability to modify the behavior of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity,
- Ability to manage the cryptographic keys,
- Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality,
- Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying,
- Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps,
- Ability to configure NTP,
- Ability to configure the reference identifier for the peer,
- Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust anchors,
- Ability to import X509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store,
- Ability to manage the trusted public keys database].

(TD0631 applied)

5.1.4.5 Restrictions on Security Roles (NDcPP22e:FMT_SMR.2)**NDcPP22e:FMT_SMR.2.1**

The TSF shall maintain the roles: - Security Administrator.

NDcPP22e:FMT_SMR.2.2

The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

NDcPP22e:FMT_SMR.2.3

The TSF shall ensure that the conditions

- The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;
- The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely

are satisfied.

5.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

5.1.5.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords (NDcPP22e:FPT_APW_EXT.1)

NDcPP22e:FPT_APW_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall store administrative passwords in non-plaintext form.

NDcPP22e:FPT_APW_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext administrative passwords.

5.1.5.2 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys) (NDcPP22e:FPT_SKP_EXT.1)

NDcPP22e:FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.

5.1.5.3 Reliable Time Stamps (NDcPP22e:FPT_STM_EXT.1)

NDcPP22e:FPT_STM_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.

NDcPP22e:FPT_STM_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall [*allow the Security Administrator to set the time, synchronise time with an NTP server*]. (TD0632 applied)

5.1.5.4 TSF testing (NDcPP22e:FPT_TST_EXT.1)

NDcPP22e:FPT_TST_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [*during initial start-up (on power on)*] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [*cryptographic algorithm self-tests, firmware integrity tests*].

5.1.5.5 Trusted update (NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1)

NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to query the currently executing version of the TOE firmware/software and [*the most recently installed version of the TOE firmware/software*].

NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE firmware/software and [*no other update mechanism*].

NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a [*digital signature*] prior to installing those updates.

5.1.6 TOE access (FTA)

5.1.6.1 TSF-initiated Termination (NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.3)

NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.3.1

The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security Administrator-configurable time interval of session inactivity.

5.1.6.2 User-initiated Termination (NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.4)

NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.4.1

The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator's own interactive session.

5.1.6.3 TSF-initiated Session Locking (NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL_EXT.1)

NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [*terminate the session*] after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.

5.1.6.4 Default TOE Access Banners (NDcPP22e:FTA_TAB.1)

NDcPP22e:FTA_TAB.1.1

Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a Security Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding use of the TOE.

5.1.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP)

5.1.7.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (NDcPP22e:FTP_ITC.1)

NDcPP22e:FTP_ITC.1.1

The TSF shall be capable of using [*TLS*] to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, [*authentication server*] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.

NDcPP22e:FTP_ITC.1.2

The TSF shall permit the TSF or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

NDcPP22e:FTP_ITC.1.3

The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [*transmitting audit records to an audit server, authenticating using a Radius server*].
(TD0639 applied)

5.1.7.2 Trusted Path (NDcPP22e:FTP_TRP.1/Admin)

NDcPP22e:FTP_TRP.1.1/Admin

The TSF shall be capable of using [*SSH*] to provide a communication path between itself and authorized remote Administrators that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from disclosure and provides detection of modification of the channel data.

NDcPP22e:FTP_TRP.1.2/Admin

The TSF shall permit remote Administrators to initiate communication via the trusted path.

NDcPP22e:FTP_TRP.1.3/Admin

The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial Administrator authentication and all remote administration actions.
(TD0639 applied)

5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The SARs for the TOE are the components as specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. Note that the SARs have effectively been refined with the assurance activities explicitly defined in association with both the SFRs and SARs.

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
ADV: Development	ADV_FSP.1: Basic Functional Specification
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1: Operational User Guidance
	AGD_PRE.1: Preparative Procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.1: Labelling of the TOE
	ALC_CMS.1: TOE CM Coverage
ATE: Tests	ATE_IND.1: Independent Testing - Conformance
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.1: Vulnerability Survey

Table 4 Assurance Components

5.2.1 Development (ADV)

5.2.1.1 Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)

ADV_FSP.1.1d

The developer shall provide a functional specification.

ADV_FSP.1.2d

The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.

ADV_FSP.1.1c

The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.

ADV_FSP.1.2c

The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.

ADV_FSP.1.3c

The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.

ADV_FSP.1.4c

The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.

ADV_FSP.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ADV_FSP.1.2e

The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete instantiation of the SFRs.

5.2.2 Guidance documents (AGD)

5.2.2.1 Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)

AGD_OPE.1.1d

The developer shall provide operational user guidance.

AGD_OPE.1.1c

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings.

AGD_OPE.1.2c

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.

AGD_OPE.1.3c

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.

AGD_OPE.1.4c

The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.

AGD_OPE.1.5c

The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences, and implications for maintaining secure operation.

AGD_OPE.1.6c

The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be followed in order to fulfill the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

AGD_OPE.1.7c

The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.

AGD_OPE.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

5.2.2.2 Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)

AGD_PRE.1.1d

The developer shall provide the TOE, including its preparative procedures.

AGD_PRE.1.1c

The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.

AGD_PRE.1.2c

The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

AGD_PRE.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

AGD_PRE.1.2e

The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared securely for operation.

5.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC)

5.2.3.1 Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)

ALC_CMC.1.1d

The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.

ALC_CMC.1.1c

The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.

ALC_CMC.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

5.2.3.2 TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)

ALC_CMS.1.1d

The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.

ALC_CMS.1.1c

The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the evaluation evidence required by the SARs.

ALC_CMS.1.2c

The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.

ALC_CMS.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

5.2.4 Tests (ATE)

5.2.4.1 Independent Testing - Conformance (ATE_IND.1)

ATE_IND.1.1d

The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.

ATE_IND.1.1c

The TOE shall be suitable for testing.

ATE_IND.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ATE_IND.1.2e

The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.

5.2.5 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)

5.2.5.1 Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)

AVA_VAN.1.1d

The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.

AVA_VAN.1.1c

The TOE shall be suitable for testing.

AVA_VAN.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

AVA_VAN.1.2e

The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.

AVA_VAN.1.3e

The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential.

6. TOE Summary Specification

This chapter describes the security functions:

- Security audit
- Cryptographic support
- Identification and authentication
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE access
- Trusted path/channels

6.1 Security audit

The TOE produces syslog conformant messages in a number of circumstances including warnings about the device itself (such as temperature, power failures, etc.) as well as security relevant events (the success and failure login of the user, regardless of the authentication mechanism; changing a user's password; and adding and deleting user accounts). In each case the audit record includes the time and date, identification of the responsible subject (e.g., by network address or user ID), the type of event, the outcome of the event, and other information depending on the event type. For cryptographic keys, the TOE generates and deletes SSH host keys. The TOE can support one EC key pair and one RSA key pair. The audit records associated with these actions identify the key as either the EC key pair or RSA key pair. The TOE also generates, imports and deletes keys associated with x509 certificates. Auditing of these actions identify the keys based upon the trustpoint name corresponding to the operation being performed. In all of these audits, the audit records identify the administrator account responsible for the action. The TOE is also capable of importing SSH public keys for user authentication, and audit records identify the key by the user ID it is mapped with.

The audit records are stored in a log (internal to the TOE appliance) that is protected so that only an authorized TOE User can read the log (for which tools accessible via the CLI are provided). The protection results from the fact that the logs can be accessed only after a user logs in (see section 6.3 below).

The log stores up to 4,000 entries after which the audit entries will be overwritten, oldest first. The administrator (with Super User privilege) can (and should) choose to configure one or more external syslog servers where the TOE will simultaneously send a copy of the audit records. The TOE can be configured to use TLS (using any of the supported ciphersuites) to protect audit logs exported to an external server.

The TOE includes a hardware clock that is used to provide reliable time information for the audit records it generates.

The Security audit function satisfies the following security functional requirements:

- NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.1: The TOE can generate audit records for events including starting and stopping the audit function, administrator commands, and all other events identified in Table 3 (in Section 5). Furthermore, each audit record identifies the date/time, event type, outcome of the event, responsible subject/user, as well as the additional event-specific content indicated in Table 3 (in Section 5).
- NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.2: The TOE identifies the responsible user for each event based on the specific administrator or network entity (identified by IP address) that caused the event.
- NDcPP22e:FAU_STG_EXT.1: The TOE can be configured to export audit records to an external SYSLOG server. This communication is protected with the use of TLS.

6.2 Cryptographic support

The TOE supports a range of cryptographic services using the RUCKUS-IP-CRYPTO-VER-6.0 cryptographic library. The following functions have been CAVP tested.

Functions	Requirement	Standard	Certificate
Encryption/Decryption			
AES CBC, CTR, GCM (128 and 256 bits)	FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	ISO 10116 (CBC, CTR)	A5076

Functions	Requirement	Standard	Certificate
		ISO 19772 (GCM)	
Cryptographic hashing			
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 (digest sizes 160, 256, 384, 512)	FCS_COP.1/Hash	ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004	A5076
Keyed-hash message authentication			
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512 (digest sizes 160, 256, 384, 512)	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011	A5076
Cryptographic signature services			
RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (modulus 2048, 3072, 4096)	FCS_COP.1/SigGen	FIPS PUB 186-4	A5076
ECDSA Digital Signature Algorithm (P-256, P-384, P-521)	FCS_COP.1/SigGen	FIPS PUB 186-4	A5076
Random bit generation			
CTR_DRBG with sw based noise sources with a minimum of 256 bits of non-determinism	FCS_RBC_EXT.1	ISO/IEC 18031:2011	A5076
Key generation			
RSA Key Generation (2048, 3072, 4096 bits)	FCS_CKM.1	FIPS PUB 186-4	A5076
ECC Key Generation (P-256, P-384, P-521)		FIPS PUB 186-4	A5076
FFC Schemes using 'safe-prime' groups (2048 bits)		FIPS SP 800-90A	Tested with known good implementation
Key establishment			
RSA	FCS_CKM.2	RSAPKCS1-v1_5	Tested with known good implementation
ECC KAS		FIPS SP 800-90A	A5076
FFC Schemes using 'safe-prime' groups		FIPS SP 800-90A	Tested with known good implementation

Table 5 Cryptographic Functions

The TOE uses a software-based random bit generator that complies with Special Publication 800-90 using CTR_DRBG when operating in the FIPS mode. AES-256 is used in conjunction with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy.

The TOE supports the following secret keys, private keys and CSPs:

Key or CSP:	Zeroized upon:	Stored in:	Zeroized by:
SSH host RSA private key	Command	Flash	Overwriting once with zeros
SSH host RSA public key	Command	Flash	Overwriting once with zeros
SSH client RSA public key	Command	Flash	Overwriting once with zeros
SSH session key	End of session	RAM	Overwriting once with zeros
TLS host RSA private key	Command	Flash	Overwriting once with zeros
TLS host RSA digital certificate	Command	Flash	Overwriting once with zeros
TLS pre-master secret	Handshake done	RAM	Overwriting once with zeros
TLS session key	Close of session	RAM	Overwriting once with zeros
DH Private Exponent	New key exchange	RAM	Overwritten with new value
DH Public Key	Not applicable	RAM	Public value
User Password	Command	Flash	Overwriting once with zeros
Port Administrator Password	Command	Flash	Overwriting once with zeros
Crypto Officer Password	Command	Flash	Overwriting once with zeros

Key or CSP:	Zeroized upon:	Stored in:	Zeroized by:
Firmware Integrity / Load RSA public key	Not applicable	Flash	Public value
DRBG Seed	Every 100ms	RAM	Overwritten with new value
DRBG Value V	Every 100ms	RAM	Overwritten with new value
DRBG Constant C	Every 100ms	RAM	Overwritten with new value

Table 6 Keys and CSPs

The TOE stores all persistent secret and private keys in FLASH and stores all ephemeral keys in RAM (as indicated in the above table). The TOE's zeroization has been subjected to FIPS 140 validation and is designed to zeroize secret and private keys when they are no longer required by the TOE. Note that zeroization occurs as follows: 1) when deleted from FLASH, the previous value is overwritten once with zeroes; 2) when added or changed in FLASH, any old value is overwritten completely with the new value; and, 3) the zeroization of values in RAM is achieved by overwriting once with zeroes.

These supporting cryptographic functions are included to support the SSHv2 (compliant with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, and 4254) and TLS v1.1 (RFC4346), and TLS v1.2 (RFC 5246) secure communication protocols.

The TOE supports TLSv1.1, and v1.2 with the following ciphersuites:

- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES256_GCM_SHA384
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES128_GCM_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES128_GCM_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES256_GCM_SHA384

The TOE supports the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension with secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1 and ffdhe2048 by default.

The TOE supports SSHv2 with AES (CTR, CBC) 128 or 256 bit ciphers, in conjunction with HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-256, or HMAC-SHA2-512. The TOE supports ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, and ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 as its host public key algorithms, with diffie-hellman-group14-sha256, diffie-hellman-group16-sha512, diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, and ecdh-sha2-nistp521 for the key exchange methods. While other ciphers and hashes are implemented in the product, they are disabled while the TOE is operating in Common Criteria mode.

The TOE allows users to perform SSHv2 authentication using password based authentication and allows users to upload a public key for SSHv2 public key client authentication. The imported SSHv2 public key includes a username provided in the "Subject" field to be verified against an authenticating admin's identity. The TOE can authenticate clients using public keys with RSA keys as well as ECDSA keys using curves P-256, P-384 and P-521. Whenever the timeout period or authentication retry limit is reached, the TOE closes the applicable TCP connection and releases the SSH session resources.

The TOE's SSHv2 implementation limits SSH packets to a size of roughly 256K bytes. As SSH packets are being received, the TOE uses a buffer to build all packet information. Once complete, the packet is checked to ensure it can be appropriately decrypted. However, if it is not complete when the buffer becomes full (262131 bytes) the packet will be dropped and the connection terminated. There is a TOE initiated rekey before 1 hour or before 1GB whichever comes first.

Table 7 Service, Protocol and Key Establishment Scheme Mapping

Scheme	Protocol	Service
RSA	SSH	Remote Administration (server)
ECC	SSH	Remote Administration (server)

DH 14	SSH	Remote Administration (server)
FFC Safe Primes	TLS	Syslog and Radius (client)
ECC	TLS	Syslog and Radius (client)

The Cryptographic support function satisfies the following security functional requirements:

- NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.1: The TOE supports asymmetric key generation using RSA key establishment (key size 2048) as part of SSH as described in the section above. The TOE acts as a client for TLS (ECC and FFC safe primes) and a server for SSH (RSA, ECC, DH-14 key generation). The TOE supports DH group 14 key establishment scheme that meets standard RFC 3526, section 3 for interoperability and groups in RFC 7919. The TOE implements NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, 'Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography'.
- NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.2: See NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.1.
- NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.4: Keys are zeroized when they are no longer needed by the TOE
- NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption: The TOE performs encryption and decryption using AES in CBC CTR and GCM mode with key sizes of either 128 or 256 bits. The corresponding CAVP certificate is identified in the table above.
- NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/Hash: The TOE supports cryptographic hashing services using SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 with digest sizes 160, 256, 384, and 512. The corresponding CAVP certificate is identified in the table above.
- NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash: The TOE supports keyed-hash message authentication using HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384 and HMAC-SHA-512, using SHA-1/256/384/512 with 160/256/384/512 bit keys to produce a 160/256/384/512 output MAC. The corresponding CAVP certificate is identified in the table above
- NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/SigGen: The TOE supports the use of RSA with 2048/3072/4096 bit key sizes and ECDSA with key sizes 256/384/521 bits for cryptographic signatures. Digital signatures are used in TLS and SSH communications and on product updates. The corresponding CAVP certificate is identified in the table above.
- NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1: The TOE supports NTPv3 and NTPv4, authenticating the NTP server that it synchronizes to using a sha1 message digest. The TOE allows one or more NTP servers to be configured. At least one is required for time synchronization to occur, but more than 3 NTP servers can be specified.
- NDcPP22e:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: The TOE uses one software-based entropy source to seed for a software-based DRBG that complies with Special Publication 800-90 using CTR_DRBG when operating in the FIPS mode. AES-256 is used in conjunction with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy for the seed.
- NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1: The TOE supports SSHv2 interactive command-line secure administrator sessions as indicated above.
- NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: The TOE supports TLS when exporting audit logs to an external server and when communicating with RADIUS authentication servers. Certificate pinning is not supported. The TOE supports FQDN reference identifiers from RFC 6125 only.

6.3 Identification and authentication

The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions mediated by the TOE, except to display a message of the day banner and to permit network routing services without identification or authentication. The TOE allows unauthenticated network routing services to route network traffic through the TOE as well as unauthenticated network routing protocol traffic destined to the TOE (including DNS, ARP, ICMP, BootP, DHCP, RIP, OSPF, BGP, VRRP, VRRP-E, Multi-VRF) but does not include any management configuration of the TOE's network routing services. The TOE authenticates TOE Users against their user name, password and privilege level. The Authorized Administrator logs on the TOE through either locally using the console or remotely using SSHv2. A successful authentication is determined by a successful username and password combination. An incorrect password will result in a failed authentication attempt. The TOE also allows remote administrators to authenticate over an SSH connection using an RSA public key authentication mechanism.

The Authorized Administrator with Super User privilege represents the “administrator” referred to in the security requirements of the protection profile. Other accounts with privileges other than Super User were not tested during the evaluation. The available mechanisms include the Local Password for the Super User Privilege level and RADIUS authentication. The Authorized Administrator with Super User privilege defines local user (or TOE User) accounts and assigns passwords and privilege levels to the accounts. Each user account has a user name, password, and a privilege level associated with it. There is a default privilege level account associated with each privilege level and each has its own password. It is up to the Authorized Administrator with Super User privilege to decide whether or how to use these legacy accounts. Note however, that each has an identity, password, and privilege level.

While the Authorized Administrator with Super User privilege can create or otherwise modify accounts freely, other users cannot change their own (or any other) security attributes. Note that the TOE supports a password enforcement configuration where the minimum password length can be set by an administrator from 8 to 60 characters. Passwords can be created using any alphabetic, numeric, and a wide range of special characters ('!', '@', '#', '\$', '%', '^', '&', '(', ')').

The Authorized Administrator can set a lockout failure count for remote login attempts (the default is 3). If the count is exceeded, the targeted account is locked for an administrator-configurable time limit. Once the configured time has passed the account is unlocked. No manual administrative action is required. The local console interface is not subject to the lockout failure enforcement.

The Identification and authentication function satisfies the following security functional requirements:

- NDcPP22e:FIA_AFL.1: Remote administrator accounts can be locked for an administrator configured period of time if the failed login threshold is surpassed. Once the time configured by the administrator has passed the account is unlocked. No manual administrative action is required.
- NDcPP22e:FIA_PMG_EXT.1: The TOE implements a rich set of password composition constraints as described above.
- NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU.7: The TOE does not echo passwords as they are entered; rather ‘*’ characters are echoed when entering passwords.
- NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU_EXT.2: The TOE uses local password-based authentication and RADIUS server authentication.
- NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1: The TOE does not offer any services or access to its functions, except for the switching/routing of network traffic and displaying a message of the day banner, without requiring a user to be identified and authenticated.
- NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev: Certificates are validated as part of the authentication process when they are presented to the TOE and when they are loaded into the TOE. Validation of certificates used for authentication by a TLS server verifies that the certificate presented to the TOE includes the appropriate EKU (e.g., Server Auth). OCSP is supported for X509v3 certificate revocation checking. The TOE performs the same revocation checking on certificates regardless of whether it receives a full certificate chain or only a leaf certificate. Trusted CA’s are loaded to the file system in PEM format using a CLI command leveraging SCP. As this requires CLI access this can only be performed by authorized administrators who have been authenticated. The TOE chooses what trusted CA to use for certificate chain validation based on the trustpoint configured for the relevant TLS profile. Certificates must chain to the trusted root CA identified with the configured trustpoint.
- NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.2: Certificates are checked and if found not valid are not accepted or if the OCSP server cannot be contacted for validity checks (i.e., revocation status), then the certificate is not accepted. This behavior is not configurable. Certificates are checked in the following order: chain validation, SAN checks, CN checks, revocation status, and lastly expiration status. The common name (or SAN values if present) needs to be a fully qualified domain name. Wildcards are not allowed in certificates.

6.4 Security management

The TOE associates each defined user account with a privilege level. The most privileged level is Super User (with regards to the requirements in this Security Target, users with lesser privilege levels are referred to collectively simply as TOE users since such users do not have complete read-and-write access to the system). Again, as stated in section

6.3, other accounts with privileges other than Super User were not tested during the evaluation. The TOE implements an internal access control mechanism that bases decisions about the use of functions and access to TOE data on those privilege levels. In this manner, the TOE is able to ensure that only the Authorized Administrator with Super User privilege can access audit configuration data, information flow policy ACLs, user and administrator security attributes (including passwords and privilege levels), authentication method lists, the logon failure threshold, the remote access user list; and cryptographic support settings.

Other than the Super User level, the TOE implements a Read Only level where only basic commands can be issued and no changes can be made and a Port Configuration level where non-security device parameters can be managed. Collectively, this ST refers to all users of the TOE as “TOE Users” where TOE Users privileges are a subset of the broader role of “Authorized Administrator with Super User privilege”.

The TOE offers command line functions which are accessible via the CLI. The CLI is a text based interface which can be accessed from a directly connected terminal or via a remote terminal using SSH. These command line functions can be used to effectively manage every security policy, as well as the non-security relevant aspects of the TOE.

Once authenticated (none of these functions is available to any user before being identified and authenticated), authorized administrators have access to the following security functions:

- Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
- Ability to configure the access banner;
- Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
- Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using digital signature capability prior to installing those updates;
- Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;
- Ability to modify the behavior of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity;
- Ability to manage the cryptographic keys
- Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;
- Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
- Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
- Ability to configure NTP;
- Ability to configure the reference identifier for the peer;
- Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust anchors;
- Ability to import X509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store;
- Ability to manage the trusted public keys database;

The Security management function satisfies the following security functional requirements:

- NDcPP22e:FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate: Only the authorized administrator can update the TOE.
- NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CoreData: Only the authorized administrator can configure TSF-related functions.
- NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys: Only the authorized administrator can configure cryptographic keys. The keys an authorized administrator can manage consist of importing trusted Root CA certs, generating SSH host keys, and importing SSH public keys. All of these keys can be also be deleted.
- NDcPP22e:FMT_SMF.1: The TOE provides administrative interfaces to perform the functions identified above.
- NDcPP22e:FMT_SMR.2: The TOE maintains administrative user roles.

6.5 Protection of the TSF

The TOE is an appliance and as such is designed to work independent of other components to a large extent. Secure communication with third-party peers as addressed in section 6.7.

The TOE does not provide access to locally stored passwords (which can be administratively configured to be protected by SHA-1 or SHA-256) and also, while cryptographic keys can be entered, the TOE does not disclose any cryptographic keys stored in the TOE. The TOE is a hardware appliance that includes a hardware-based real-time clock. The TOE's embedded OS manages the clock and exposes administrator clock-related functions. The TOE can be configured to periodically synchronize its clock with a time server, but the TOE can only ensure its own reliability and not that of an external time mechanism. The TOE also implements the timing elements through timeout functionality due to inactivity for terminating both local and remote sessions. Note that the clock is used primarily to provide timestamp for audit records, but is also used to support timing elements of cryptographic functions.

The TOE includes a number of built in diagnostic tests that are run during start-up to determine whether the TOE is operating properly. If a self-test fails, the TOE is not operational and reboots until the error is cleared or the administrator gets help from Ruckus. When operating in FIPS mode, the power-on self-tests comply with the FIPS 140-2 requirements for self-testing. The module performs Cryptographic algorithm known answer tests, firmware integrity tests using RSA signature verification and conditional self-tests for DRBG, Hardware RNG, Pair-wise consistency tests on generation of RSA keys, and a Firmware load test (RSA signature verification). Upon failing any of its FIPS mode power-on self-tests, the TOE will refuse to boot. The tests are sufficient to ensure the correct operation of the security features as they address firmware integrity and cryptographic operations.

The TOE supports loading a new software image manually by the administrator using CLI commands. From the CLI, an administrator can use SCP in order to download a software image, and the TOE, prior to actually installing and using the new software image, will verify its digital signature using a pre-installed vendor key. An unverified image cannot be installed. The downloaded software image is saved to flash memory and is installed after rebooting the TOE.

This section also states that the TOE maintains a primary and secondary boot image. The TOE can run from either the primary or secondary boot image. Administrator CLI commands define which image the TOE boots and which boot image is updated during a TOE update. The administrator can also query the TOE configuration to see the currently loaded images and the image that will boot next. The reload command causes the currently running image to orderly shutdown and the system to boot into the new image specified by the configuration.

The Protection of the TSF function satisfies the following security functional requirements:

- NDcPP22e:FPT_APW_EXT.1: The TOE does not offer any functions that will disclose to any user a plain text password. Furthermore, locally defined passwords are not stored in plaintext form, only their hash value is stored.
- NDcPP22e:FPT_SKP_EXT.1: The TOE does not offer any functions that will disclose to any users a stored cryptographic key. Keys are stored as identified in Table 6 when they are created
- NDcPP22e:FPT_STM_EXT.1: The TOE includes its own hardware clock and can synchronize its time with an external NTP server.
- NDcPP22e:FPT_TST_EXT.1: The TOE performs a suite of self-tests to verify its integrity.
- NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: The TOE provides functions to query the version and upgrade the software embedded in the TOE appliance. When installing updated software, digital signatures are used to authenticate the update to ensure it is the update intended and originated by the vendor.

6.6 TOE access

The TOE can be configured to display an administrator-configured message of the day banner that will be displayed before authentication is completed (before the user enters his password). The banner will be displayed when accessing the TOE via the console or SSH interfaces.

The TOE can be configured by an administrator to set a session timeout value (any value 0-240 minutes for console and SSH with 0 disabling the timeout). The default timeout is 2 minutes for both console and SSH. A session (local or remote) that is inactive (i.e., no commands issuing from the remote client) for the defined timeout value will be terminated. Upon exceeding the session timeout (if set), the TOE logs the user off, but leaves the user's console displaying the last contents.

The user will be required to login in after any session has been terminated due to inactivity or after voluntary termination. Of course, administrators can logout of local or remote sessions at any time.

The TOE access function satisfies the following security functional requirements:

- NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.3: The TOE terminates remote sessions that have been inactive for an administrator-configured period of time.
- NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.4: The TOE provides the function to logout (or terminate) both local and remote user sessions as directed by the user.
- NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL_EXT.1: The TOE terminates local sessions that have been inactive for an administrator-configured period of time.
- NDcPP22e:FTA_TAB.1: The TOE can be configured to display administrator-defined advisory banners when administrators successfully establish interactive sessions with the TOE, allowing administrators to terminate their session prior to performing any functions.

6.7 Trusted path/channels

The TOE provides a trusted path for its remote administrative users accessing the TOE via the Ethernet ports provided on the TOE using a command line interface protected by SSH. Note that local administrator access via the serial port is also allowed for command line access. However, this access is protected by physical protection of the serial interface along with the TOE itself.

When an administrator attempts to connect to the TOE remotely, the TOE attempts to negotiate a TLS-protected session. If the session cannot be negotiated, the connection is dropped.

Remote connections to third-party SYSLOG servers are supported for exporting audit records to an external audit server. Remote connections to an external RADIUS server are supported for external user authentication. Communication with those external servers is protected using TLS (as specified earlier).

In all cases, the endpoints are assured by virtue of the certificates installed, trusted, and reviewable when connecting and by virtue of user authentication.

The Trusted path/channels function satisfies the following security functional requirements:

- NDcPP22e:FTP_ITC.1: In the evaluated configuration, the TOE can be configured to use TLS to ensure that any exported audit records and authentication server communications are sent only to the configured server so they are not subject to inappropriate disclosure or modification
- NDcPP22e:FTP_TRP.1/Admin: The TOE uses SSH to provide a trusted path for remote management interfaces to protect the communication from disclosure and modification.